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Abstract 
 
This study explores the multiple representational roles evoked by Commission officials. The 
article has a dual ambition: The first is to outline an institutional perspective on representation 
that seizes a middle-ground between intergovernmental and neo-functional notions of 
representation. The second ambition is to empirically illuminate this perspective inside the 
Commission. Based on survey and interview data on temporary hired officials in the 
Commission, The empirical observations support an institutional perspective on 
representation in two ways. First, Commission officials tend to evoke multiple 
representational roles. Hence, the uni-dimensional approaches on representation offered by 
intergovernmental and neo-funcationalist accounts are challenged. Secondly, the composite 
mix of representational roles evoked by Commission officials reflects the organisational 
boundaries and hierarchies embedding them. Representation within the Commission is indeed 
a balancing act that is considerably biased by the formal organisation of the Commission, the 
multiple organisational embeddedness of the staff, their degrees of organisational affiliation 
towards the Commission, their modes of interaction within the Commission, as well as their 
educational backgrounds.   
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INTRODUCTION1 
Representation is one essential but under-researched dimension of executive governance. 
Representation entails balancing multiple competing, inconsistent and loosely coupled 
demands and concerns, often simultaneously. This article argues that governance dynamics 
are reflected by the way trade-offs are handled between competing representational roles in 
everyday decision-making (Wilson 1989, 327). The study confronts one classical problem in 
executive governance beleaguered of the inherent trade-off between loyalty to politico-
administrative leadership, departmental autonomy and professional neutrality (Jacobsen 1960, 
Wilson 1989, 342). Moreover, this triangular role repertoire is supplemented by a fourth 
element: supranational representation. The European Commission (Commission) is one 
pivotal international executive institution where the staff is constantly ripped between these 
four competing representational roles (Egeberg 2006; Hooghe 2005; Laffan 2004, 76). This 
study outlines an institutional perspective that accounts for the conditions under which 
Commission officials are likely to evoke particular representational roles. The second 
ambition of the article is to empirically illuminate this perspective inside the Commission. 
The empirical observations presented support an institutional perspective on representation in 
two ways. First, temporary Commission officials tend to evoke multiple representational 
roles. Hence, the uni-dimensional approaches on representation offered by intergovernmental 
and neo-functionalist accounts are challenged. Secondly, the composite mix of 
representational roles evoked by these officials reflects the organisational boundaries and 
hierarchies embedding them. Representation within the Commission is a balancing act that is 
considerably biased by the formal organisation of the Commission, the multiple 
organisational embeddedness of the staff, their degrees of organisational affiliation towards 
the Commission, their modes of interaction inside the Commission, as well as their 
educational background.   
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An institutional perspective on representation is outlined as a middle-ground between 
intergovernmental and neo-functional approaches on representation. An intergovernmental 
perspective pictures the Commission as an arena for bargaining between national government 
representatives. According to this view the possibility for role ambiguity is not acknowledged. 
Implicit in the intergovernmental perspective is a notion of ‘imperative representation’ (see 
below) where civil servants are expected to behave solely as national representatives. A neo-
functional approach claims that civil servants may over time shift loyalties from a national to 
a supranational level; thus alluding to an idea of ‘liberal representation’ (Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet 1998). This article argues that an institutional perspective may occupy a middle ground 
between an intergovernmental and a neo-functional notion of representation. In an era of 
increased “post-territorial diplomacy” (Hevener 1986, 69) an institutional perspective 
highlights the potential conflicts that may arise between competing, inconsistent and 
ambiguous representational roles. An institutional perspective alludes to a notion of 
‘ambiguous representation’ (see below), where the civil servants act upon multiple, and 
sometimes, poorly understood roles. The ambiguity lies in the fact that it is not always clear to 
whom the representative is responsible to. Secondly, an institutional approach suggests scope 
conditions that specify the conditions under which each representational role is likely to be 
evoked. This article suggests that the representational roles enacted by Commission officials 
are considerably biased by the following five scope conditions: (i) the formal organisation of 
the Commission apparatus, (ii) the degrees of organisational compatibility between the 
Commission services and domestic government institutions, (iii) the organisational affiliations 
of the officials, (iv) the intensity and sustainability by which these officials interact within the 
Commission, and finally, (v) the educational backgrounds of the officials.  
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The institutional perspective is empirically illuminated by observations among seconded 
national experts (SNEs) in the Commission. Of the Commission workforce of 25 000 
officials, some 1000 officials are seconded on temporary posts. These officials are a crucial 
test-bed for measuring the extent to which the Commission impact on the representational 
roles of its staff. SNEs are recruited to the Commission on short term contracts (maximum 
four years), paid by their home government, and the majority foresee a return to past positions 
in domestic ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts come to an end (CLENAD 
2003). By swearing an oath of neutrality and loyalty to the Commission, SNEs transfer their 
primary organisational affiliation from the member-state administration to the Commission. 
In practice SNEs make decisions within the Commission almost on the same footing as 
permanent A-officials. According to the old rules for SNEs, ”national experts have the same 
rights and obligations as EU officials…” (Commission 2002, 50). However, new Commission 
rules on SNEs, Art. 6, grants SNEs a B-status compared to ordinary Commission officials.2 
Studying SNEs in the Commission can demonstrate how institutional ambiguities trigger 
representational ambiguities. 
 
The argument is presented in the following steps: The next section unpacks the concept of 
representation and suggests four representational roles available to SNEs: an 
intergovernmental role, a supranational role, a departmental (portfolio) role, and an epistemic 
(professional) role. Next, an institutional perspective is outlined suggesting five scope 
conditions that systematically impact on these four roles. Finally, to test the merit of the 
institutional perspective, this study offers fresh survey (N=72) and interview (N=22) data on 
SNEs. 
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ON THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION3 
The concept of representation is poorly understood and rarely studied empirically in the world 
of government officials (Mayntz 1999, 83; Pitkin 1972). At the etymological level, 
representation means, “making present again” (Pitkin 1972, 8). Thus, representation means 
“the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or 
in fact” (Pitkin 1972, 8-9 - original emphasis). The term representation “directs attention first 
of all, to the attitudes, expectations and behaviours of the represented” (Eulau et al. 1959, 
743). As such, representation depends, amongst other things, on how it is conceived by the 
actors. Symbolic representation in this sense requires that the connection between symbol and 
referent “is believed in” (Pitkin 1972, 100). An individual is representative in a symbolic 
sense ”by what he is or how he is regarded” (Pitkin 1972, 113). The role perceptions evoked 
by civil servants are thus vital in determining their representational status. In this study the 
representative status of SNEs is measured by the role perceptions evoked by them.4  
 
Role perceptions are important to study because they have “a significant influence on human 
behaviour”, particularly when actors have behavioural discretion at their disposal (Sen 1998, 
5; Wilson 1989, 54). Hence, studying roles as conceived by the actors themselves may help 
explaining their actual behaviour (Searing 1994, 14; cf. Eulau 1959, 746; Wish 1980, 535). A 
further rationale for studying the symbolic aspects of representation is the lack of such 
research.  
 
Representation always involves a relationship between the representative(s) and those 
represented (Eulau 1959, 743). Theories of representation have been mainly occupied with the 
relationship between the electorate and the elected. This study emphasises the relationships 
between individual civil servants and the executive institutions in which they are embedded. 
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This relationship may be based on trust or enmity, on formal or informal rules, on shared 
notions of representative quality or on contending notions of true representation. The 
symbolic relationship between representatives and their constituents may vary between two 
extremes. At one extreme, representation means evoking representational roles that are 
closely and solely knit to constituents (an imperative notion of representation). On the other 
extreme, representation means having the free will to evoke representational roles that may 
deviate from this default position (a liberal notion of representation). The middle-ground 
between these extremes is occupied by an institutional perspective on representation where 
representation is gauged at balancing a complex set of contending representational roles (an 
ambiguous notion of representation).  
 
The Commission, like most executive institutions, has an inbuilt tension between different 
governance dynamics, notably between intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and 
epistemic dynamics (Trondal 2006). The repertoire of representational roles available to SNEs 
includes (i) an intergovernmental role guided by loyalty to their home government, preference 
for national interests, and contacts with their home base, and (ii) a supranational role coached 
by the top leadership of the Commission, an internalised loyalty towards - and a feeling of 
membership in - the Commission as a whole, and a preference for “the common European 
good” (Mayntz 1999, 83). Thirdly, a departmental role predicts SNEs to be “neutral, 
intelligent, generalist professionals who advice ministers” (Richards and Smith 2004, 779). 
Thus, SNEs are expected to evoke classical Weberian civil servant virtues, attach identity 
towards their Commission Unit and DG, and abide to administrative rules and proper 
procedures (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 167). Finally, SNEs are highly educated officials, 
recruited on the basis of past merits, and with a professional esteem attached to their 
educational background. The epistemic role predicts SNEs to enjoy a great deal of 
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behavioural autonomy, prepare, argue and negotiate on the basis of their professional 
expertise, and legitimate their authority on neutral competences (Haas 1992). Their selection 
of role is expected to be guided by considerations of scientific and professional correctness 
and the power of the better argument (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). This is the ‘Monnet 
official’ who is institutionally autonomous and a high-flying technocrat. 
 
SEIZING THE MIDDLE GROUND: TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON REPRESENTATION 
Three models of representation are outlined below. However, these models have different 
analytical purposes. The notions of imperative and liberal representation are outlined as 
analytical extremes from which the institutional perspective serves as a middle-ground. The 
institutional perspective theorises how the potential mix of different representational roles 
may shift under different institutional conditions. Our ambition is to unpack the latter 
approach and test it empirically inside the Commission. 
 
An imperative notion of representation 
At one extreme, the idea of imperative representation maintains that “true representation 
occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from [their] constituents” 
(Pitkin 1972, 146). This notion of representation is vested in a vertical conception of 
accountability where delegates act on the basis of political and legal mandates issued by one 
principal (Pollack 2003). The agents are assumed to adapt optimally to the mandates 
(contracts) issued by utility-maximising principals. The classic model of diplomacy 
considered the exercise of behavioural discretion as a deviation from a default position 
governed by written mandates (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 101). From a symbolic viewpoint, true 
representation occurs when actors evoke representational roles that are tightly knit to this 
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principal. The imperative notion of representation is based on the simplifying assumption of 
the necessity of coherence and on the primacy of instrumental rationality (Hay 2004; March 
1988, 254). It also builds on the parsimonious assumption that there exist one unitary 
principal that successfully controls its agents, and that there exist one hierarchical chain of 
command from the former to the latter. “Defenders of this notion of representation tend to 
conceive of representatives as if they were delegates with uni-dimensional institutional 
affiliations and allegiances (Olsen 1988, 162). “[T]he possibility of conflict in role 
orientations is clearly envisaged and resolved in favour of subordinating one’s independence 
to what is considered a superior authority” (Eulau 1959, 750). Hence, potential role conflicts 
are “seen as moving towards resolution” (March 1988, 17).  
 
As seen from an imperative perspective, SNEs will evoke solely the role as a ‘government 
representative’. The representational status is rigidly fixed and stable, and impossible to 
mould or remould during their Commission career. An imperative notion of representation is 
founded on a conservative ontology where roles are fixed, stable, coherent, precise and 
exogenous (March 1988, 277). The Commission is viewed as an intergovernmental institution 
established to maximise national preferences as pursued by their delegates. The choices made 
by delegates are based on the logic of consequentiality thereby striving to maximise the utility 
function of their principal (Hay 2004, 41). If SNEs, however, should take on representational 
roles that deviate significantly from the ‘government representative’ role (‘free riding’), s/he 
may be recalled, either permanently or temporarily (Christophersen 1986). Delegates, thus, 
have clear incentives not to deviate from their default position (the government 
representative’ role). The imperative notion of representation thus highlights a delegation 
problem (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Chief to this problem is potential that civil servants 
(agents) act on representational roles of their own choosing rather than on those of their 
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leadership (principal) (‘shirking’) (Pollack 2003, 26). This problem is omnipotent in situations 
where SNEs develop roles that are in conflict with their role as a government representative. 
The delegation problem and the problem of representation, therefore, are two sides of the 
same coin (Mayntz 1999). 
 
A liberal notion of representation 
At the other extreme lies the idea of “complete independence” of the representative (Pitkin 
1972, 146). Examples of this are the delegation of executive and implementation authority to 
regulatory agencies within technically intricate policy areas (Pollack 2003, 23). It is assumed 
that true representation emerges only when the representative has the leeway to evoke 
representational roles which may deviate from the ‘government representative’ role. The 
representatives must “not be bound by instructions, from whatever source, but must be guided 
by what Edmund Burke called ‘his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened 
conscience’” (Eulau 1959, 744). Defenders of this notion of representation conceive of 
representation as a complex task, beyond the capacities of ordinary individuals. 
Representatives are typically independent experts with a great deal of behavioural discretion 
at their disposal, resembling Plato’s ‘wise men’ pursuing “superior understanding of the 
subject and the procedures of decision-making” (Rometsch and Wessels 1996, 216). They 
represent expertise and superior knowledge (Radaelli 2003). According to the ‘runaway-
bureaucracy thesis’, agents possess an information advantage over their principal, leaving the 
agents free to choose role (Pollack 2003, 39). Decisions are reached by trustees on the basis 
of ‘the best argument’. The liberal concept of representation thus builds on a deliberative 
perspective where free individuals argue, persuade and deliberate to reach the ‘best’ solutions 
on the basis of the ‘best’ arguments (Christophersen 1986, 37; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; 
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Eulau 1959, 744). Accountability is ultimately horizontal, built on due procedures among 
other-regarding peers (Risse 2000).  
 
The liberal concept of representation signifies that weak ties may exist between 
representatives and those they represent. The representative have been authorised to act 
without a mandate or within the wide area of discretion provided by a broad or vague mandate 
(Jönsson and Hall 2005, 105; Pollack 2003, 22). For example, SNEs with a long tenure in the 
Commission and who generally interact fairly intensive face-to-face with fellow colleagues in 
the Commission may over time develop a distinctive supranational role. Moreover, SNEs tend 
to deal with highly complex and technical dossiers. The technical content of the portfolios 
assigned to SNEs, together with their educational background as professionals, is conducive 
to the emergence of an ‘independent expert’ role among them. In short, SNEs are likely to 
depart from the ‘government representative’ role.   
 
An institutional perspective on representation 
A middle ground between the imperative and the liberal models of representation is seized by 
an institutional perspective. According to this approach the Commission is a transformative 
institution that systematically redirects the representational roles amongst the staff. Whereas 
the basis for representation is largely uncontested in the two former models, representative 
quality is ambiguous and shifting in this third perspective. Representatives are seen as having 
multiple institutional affiliations and roles to play (Pescosolido and Rubin 2000, 65). 
Representatives have multiple, shifting and often unclear principals (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 
109). The uni-dimensional model of representation is replaced by a concept of multiple 
representation, which also introduces role conflict as a constitutive aspect of representation 
(Barnett 1993, 276; Elster 1986; March and Olsen 1989; Stryker and Statham 1985, 336). The 
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institutional perspective is dynamic by allowing for variations in the composite mix of 
representational roles among actors. Moreover, this perspective is focused on the balances 
that may occur among different representational roles. Finally, this approach highlights that 
particular balances of roles are conditioned by the organisational context that embeds the 
actors (Simon 1997, 283).  
 
According to an institutional perspective roles tend to be fuzzy, inconsistent and changing 
over time (March 1988, 269). The multiplicity and ambiguity of roles reflect that 
organisations tend to embody multiple and competing principles of organisation, goals and 
missions (Wilson 1989, 26). When actors strive to cope with role conflicts, existing roles may 
be “strengthened, combined with other identities and roles, modified or dropped” (Christensen 
and Røvik 1999, 168). Complementary strategies for coping with role conflicts are (i) to live 
with them and to cultivate the differences (Smith 1992); (ii) to de-couple conflicting roles or 
role elements (DiMaggio and Powell 1991); (iii) to attach sequential attention towards 
contending role perceptions (Simon 1997); or (iv) to specialise organisational structures in 
order to separate between different roles (Egeberg 2006). Hence, coping with role conflicts is 
not synonymous with resolving them (Stryker and Statham 1985). According to an 
institutional perspective actors enact different roles in different situations and at different 
times. 
 
An institutional perspective introduces organisational variables as scope conditions that bias 
actors’ choice of representational roles. Representatives are embedded within multiple formal 
organisations that focus on selected aspects of reality (Olsen 1988, 167-168; Schattschneider 
1960). Each organisational membership offers the official with a simplified cognitive 
representation of the world that constrains and enables role enactment (Gavetti and Leventhal 
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2000, 117). Roles compete for relevance, and organisational structures allocate systematic 
attention to certain roles in certain situations (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000, 57). Each 
organisational structure provides cognitive scripts that simplify search for alternatives (March 
1988, 3). Hence, organisational boundaries limit the connections among representational roles 
within the organisation (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000, 192). Officials’ connections to 
institutions are “multiple and often temporary, not single and lifelong” (Pescosolido and 
Rubin 2000, 62). Representatives have multiple organisational sub-memberships and true 
representation is a function of the mix of different representational roles stemming from these 
memberships. Accordingly, the representative quality is a result of the interplay between 
various representational roles (Augier and March 2004, 23; March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 
1988, 169). The notion of representative ambiguity therefore views government systems as 
fragmented, with multiple representative channels, and where it is difficult to determine who 
the representatives actually are and who they represent (March 1988; Olsen 1988: 170; 
Rokkan 1966). According to this institutional perspective, we expect SNEs to evoke a mixed 
set of representational roles in different institutional contexts. In the following we identify 
five scope conditions that systematically bias the representational roles evoked by SNEs.  
 
(i) First, the representational roles evoked by SNEs are likely to be affected by the formal 
structure of the Commission services, that is, the horizontal specialisation into DGs and units, 
and the vertical specialisation of the Commission hierarchy. One proxy of the vertical 
organisation of the Commission is the formal rank position of SNEs. Arguably, SNEs in top 
rank positions (for example A1) are likely to represent the organisation as a whole (a 
supranational role), whereas SNEs in bottom rank positions (for example A8) are more likely 
to represent their unit (departmental role) and professional expertise (epistemic role) (Mayntz 
1999, 84). With respect to the horizontal organisation of the Commission, the DG and unit 
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structure is largely specialised according to two conventional principles of organisation: 
purpose and process (Gulick 1937). Whereas the principle of purpose is likely to trigger the 
enactment of a departmental role among SNEs, the principle of process is more likely to 
strengthen an epistemic role perception among them. Because officials consume most of their 
time and energy within organisational sub-units, they tend to make affective ties primarily 
towards their sub-unit and less towards the organisation as a whole. 
 
(2) SNEs have a multiple organisational embeddedness in Europe, beyond the Commission 
(Trondal 2000). To illuminate how multiple organisational embeddedness may affect the 
representational roles among SNEs, “the domestic [is brought] back in” by considering 
organisational incompatibility across levels of government (see Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; 
Zurn and Checkel 2005, 1047). Recent studies of socialisation and identify change in Europe 
clearly point to the importance of domestic institutions and processes (Herrmann, Risse and 
Brewer 2004). Arguably, the enactment of a supranational role by SNEs is conditioned by 
some degrees of organisational incompatibility between the domestic ministries and agencies 
from which SNEs originate, and the Commission (Egeberg 2006). Organisational 
incompatibility creates mutual insulations of actors and organisations. Organisational 
incompatibility creates an exposure to new cognitive scripts and new codes of appropriate 
behaviour, challenging officials to change their role perceptions (Hooghe 2005). SNEs who 
receive portfolios within the Commission that depart significantly from previous domestic 
portfolios are likely to experience a cognitive challenge to develop a new supranational role. 
Moreover, the mere perception of organisational incompatibility is arguably conducive to the 
enactment of a supranational role among SNEs. We also assume that organisational 
compatibility strengthens epistemic and departmental role perceptions among SNEs. Working 
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on similar dossiers in national ministries as well as inside the Commission is likely to 
strengthen perceptions of sector expertise as well as perceptions of portfolio belongingness.  
 
(3) The representational roles evoked by SNEs may also be affected by their degrees of 
organisational affiliation to the Commission. The bounded rationality of humans reduces their 
capacity to attend to more than one organisation at a time (Simon 1997, 288). The logic of 
primacy implies that primary institutional affiliations of civil servants affect their role 
perceptions more extensively than their secondary affiliations (Egeberg 1999). Consequently, 
secondary institutions modify the effect of primary institutions only marginally, and the effect 
of secondary institutions are shaped and biased by primary institutions. SNEs have their 
primary institutional affiliation inside the Commission. Hence, they are likely to be more 
supranationally than intergovernmentally oriented while staying in the Commission.  
 
(4) Fourth, it is assumed that intensive and sustained participation among SNEs inside the 
Commission is conducive to SNEs enacting a supranational role. Officials who devote a great 
deal of time and energy inside the Commission are likely to be slowly re-socialised and start 
identifying with the Commission as a whole (Trondal 2006). This claim rests on socialisation 
theory that predicts a positive relationship between the intensity of participation within a 
collective group and the extent to which members of this group develop perceptions of group 
belongingness and an esprit de corps (Checkel 2005). In other words, repeated interaction 
among actors encourages them to experiment with new roles (March 1988, 261).  
 
(5) Finally, according to an institutional perspective the educational background of actors may 
affect their selection and perception of role (Selden 1998). Studies of the social biographies of 
civil servants demonstrate that the educational background variable is the single most 
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important background factor for understanding the decision-making behaviour of government 
officials (Christensen, Lægreid and Zuna 2001). According to the neo-functionalist school, 
epistemic communities of highly educated experts fuel the development of both a 
supranational and an epistemic role (Haas 1992). Both the length of education as well as type 
of education matters. In this study we measure the effect of international versus a national 
educational background with respect to the representational roles evoked by SNEs. SNEs with 
educational experiences from outside their home country or from truly international 
universities (e.g. the College of Europe, Brugge) are more likely to adopt a supranational role 
perception prior to entering the Commission compared with SNEs having a national 
educational background. 
 
*   *   * 
 
According to the institutional perspective outlined, organisational scope conditions may 
systematically affect the composite mix of representational roles enacted by SNEs. The next 
section offers primary data that illuminates the causal relationships suggested above. Table 1 
summarises the predicted causal relationships. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
The observations reported below are based on a recent survey and interview study among 
SNEs in the Commission. The survey data results from a postal inquiry conducted in 2004 on 
a sample of 125 SNEs from different EU member-states, and the EEA countries Norway and 
Iceland.5 After three rounds of reminders the final sample totals 72, which gives a response 
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rate of 58 percent. This response rate is low compared to surveys in domestic central 
administrations, but higher than recent studies of the Commission (Hooghe 2005). The final 
sample covers SNEs from 15 Commission DGs6, five EU member-countries and two EEA 
countries.7 Moreover, the survey is supplemented by in-depth interviews among a sub-sample 
of SNEs. 22 interviews were conducted in the winter 2004 - 2005 on the basis of a semi-
structured interview-guide. The next section is illustrated with direct quotations from 
transcribed interviews.  
 
The survey and interview data are based on a systematic selection of SNEs, not on a random 
sample. This procedure does not allow for empirical generalisations. Still, “[s]mall Ns can 
yield big conclusions” (Andersen 2003, 3 – original emphasis). One road to empirical 
generalisations is by reference to other empirical studies that support or reject our findings. In 
addition, our empirical observations are interpreted by reference to the institutional 
perspective outlined above. However, the low number of respondents requires that 
conclusions are drawn with caution. 
 
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE WORLD OF COMMISSION SNES 
The representational roles evoked by SNEs may be measured by the loyalties deemed 
important to them. Table 1 reveals the relative importance attached to supranational, 
intergovernmental, departmental and epistemic loyalties among SNEs. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
As predicted, Table 2 demonstrates that SNEs evoke multiple loyalties. Being multiply 
embedded SNEs have several representational roles to play. The two loyalties evoked most 
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strongly by SNEs are epistemic and departmental. As predicted, SNEs who are positioned in 
medium rank positions in the Commission hierarchy attach stronger loyalty towards their own 
DG and profession than towards the Commission as a whole. SNEs also evoke fairly strong 
supranational loyalties as compared to intergovernmental loyalties. This observation 
challenges previous studies of SNEs that underscore their national loyalties (Coombes 1970; 
Smith 1973; Smith 2001). The observations reported in Table 2 reflect the perceived 
insulation of SNEs vis-à-vis their home governments (Trondal 2006). According to one SNE, 
“I have very little contact with my ministry back home, almost nothing” (interview – author’s 
translation). The following phrase seems to cover the impression of most SNEs: “Out of sight, 
out of mind” (CLENAD 2003, 26). SNEs receive “very little feedback from capitals … and 
… in general they had expected to be in closer contact with their employer” (EFTA 
Secretariat 2000, 2). These observations reflect the primacy of the Commission for SNEs and 
the perceived autonomy and insulation of SNEs vis-à-vis their home government.  
 
Our data demonstrate that SNEs rarely feel a conflict of loyalty. A bivariate correlation 
analysis (Pearson’s R) reveals positive correlations between intergovernmental loyalties on 
the one hand and departmental loyalties (.27*) and epistemic loyalties (.25*) on the other. 
Hence, the representational roles evoked by SNEs seem partly complementary. SNEs tend to 
manage multiple roles. Hence, the assumed loyalty conflict between intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism is challenged by the observations presented in Table 2. The 
representational roles evoked by SNEs thus seem to complement rather than exclude each 
other. 
 
Next, the respondents were asked to evaluate the roles played by other SNEs.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 confirms the observations of Table 2: SNEs report that other SNEs play mainly two 
representational roles – that as an ‘independent expert’ (the epistemic role) and as a ‘DG/Unit 
representative’ (the departmental role). Of less importance is the role as a ‘Commission 
representative’ (the supranational role). These observations partly reflect the horizontal 
specialisation of the Commission services by purpose and process, and partly the formal ranks 
of SNEs (the majority of SNEs are enrolled at the A7 and A8 levels). The ‘government 
representative’ role (the intergovernmental role) is perceived marginal to most SNEs. We thus 
see a triangular role repertoire among SNEs that largely transcends intergovernmentalism. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 confirms that SNEs play multiple roles. The allegiances emphasised by SNEs are 
ranked as follows: departmental allegiances, epistemic allegiances, supranational allegiances, 
and intergovernmental allegiances. A bivariate correlation analysis (Pearson’s R) reveals 
strong positive correlations between SNEs’ allegiances towards the EU system and the 
Commission (.70**), their allegiances towards the Commission and their DG (.37**), and 
their allegiances towards the DG level and the Unit level (.63**). Hence, the SNEs studied 
have developed multiple complementary allegiances inside the Commission apparatus. Owing 
to the fact that the Commission is the primary institutional affiliation to SNEs, they rank 
supranational allegiances significantly higher than intergovernmental allegiances. Moreover, 
because SNEs are enrolled into DGs and since they are highly educated officials, they evoke 
stronger allegiances towards their DG, Unit and professional background than towards the EU 
and the Commission as wholes. According to one SNE,  
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“I travel around as a representative for the Commission and speak on behalf of the 
Commission in mass media. I have a stronger responsibility for external contacts in 
the Commission than home in the ministry” (Interview – author’s translation). Another 
SNE argue that, “[w]e do not think according to nationality here. That is irrelevant. 
Nationality is only interesting over a cup of coffee” (interview – author’s translation).  
 
The SNEs were also asked if, before entering the Commission, they thought of EU co-
operation as mainly advantageous or disadvantageous. Prior to the secondment period, the 
majority of the SNEs reports being favourable to EU integration. Moreover, 52 percent of the 
SNEs confirm that they have not changed attitude in this regard during their Commission 
career. Among those that indeed changed opinion during their secondment period, the net 
tendency is towards developing more favourable attitudes towards EU integration. Hence, 
having a temporary career within the Commission contributes only marginally to attitude 
changes. Similar observations are made among national officials attending EU committees 
(Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2006, 72). As predicted, however, we find a significant 
positive Pearson Correlation between seniority within the Commission (sustained interaction) 
and the tendency of SNEs becoming more pro-integration in general (r = .33*) as well as 
within their portfolio in particular (r = .32*). Moreover, some SNEs are pre-socialised through 
their educational background (e.g. the College of Europe, Brugge) and through a multi-
national family background. Prior international experiences may also be conducive to 
supranationalism. According to Edward Page (1997, 60), SNEs generally have contacts with 
the Commission prior to entering it. Frequently, they “indicate a wish to spend three years in 
Brussels” (Page 1997, 60). This indicates that a supranational role may reflect processes of 
pre-socialisation outside as well as re-socialisation inside the Commission. 
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Finally, four OLS regression models are offered to assess the clout of the theoretical 
predictions set out in Table 1. The dependent variables applied in the regression analyses are 
based on the following question that was posed to the SNEs: “To what extent do you think 
seconded national experts from other countries act like ‘government representatives’, 
‘Commission representatives’, ‘DG/Unit representatives’, or ‘independent experts’? The 
regression models apply the following independent variables: The formal rank of SNEs, the 
degree of informal interaction with fellow colleagues with other national origins outside 
office, the seniority of SNEs, the degree of incompatibility of portfolios assigned to SNEs 
across levels of government, and finally their educational background.8 The results from the 
four OLS models are presented in Table 5.9 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 demonstrates that most of the theoretical predictions are supported, and that the 
organisational variables have the relative strongest explanatory power. Having a low rank 
positions as SNE is associated with evoking an independent expert (epistemic) role  
(-.42**) and a DG/Unit (departmental) role (-.30). Somewhat surprisingly, having a higher 
rank position is associated with enacting a government representative role (.60**). This may 
be explained by the multiple organisational embeddedness of SNEs. It might also echo that 
high rank officials tend to have more contacts with external partners (for example national 
government institutions). As predicted, Table 5 shows that SNEs who have compatible 
portfolios across levels of government tend to evoke a government representative role (-.28). 
Moreover, organisational incompatibility is associated with SNEs evoking an independent 
expert (epistemic) role (.65**), a DG/Unit (departmental) role (.34), and a Commission 
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representative (supranational) role (.29). The interaction variables show few effects, although 
informal face-to-face interaction among fellow colleagues with other national origins shows a 
negative score on the ‘government representative’ role (-.37*). Hence, intensive interaction 
within the Commission weakens the role as a government representative among SNEs. Table 
5 also reveals that having an international educational background is positively associated 
with evoking an independent expert (epistemic) role (.33*). This observation may reflect the 
pre-socialisation processes that occur among peers within universities. Finally, Table 5 shows 
that the first and the fourth regression models have explained variance above 40 percent. The 
second and the third regression models have a significant lower explained variance. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
An institutional perspective occupies a middle ground between intergovernmental and neo-
functional approaches on representation. According to an institutional perspective, 
representation is a complex and multifaceted endeavour gauged at integrating and balancing 
competing roles. Secondly, an institutional approach assumes that the composite mix of 
representational roles is affected by the organisational embeddedness of the representatives. 
True representation involves balancing multiple competing roles in different situations and at 
different times. It is argued that the representational roles enacted by Commission officials are 
considerably conditioned the following five scope conditions: the formal organisation of the 
Commission apparatus, the degrees of organisational compatibility between the Commission 
services and the ministries and agencies from which the officials originate, the organisational 
affiliations of the officials, the intensity and sustainability by which the officials interact 
within the Commission, and finally, the educational backgrounds of the officials.  
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The empirical observations presented support an institutional perspective on representation in 
two ways. First, SNEs tend to evoke multiple representational roles. Hence, the uni-
dimensional conception of representation provided by intergovernmental and neo-
funcationalist approaches are indeed challenged. Secondly, the vast majority of the predicted 
causal relationship, as presented in Table 1, is supported empirically. As shown in studies of 
organisational identities within national administrative systems (Egeberg and Saetren 1999), 
the representational roles emphasised by SNEs are clearly related to organisational boundaries 
and hierarchies of the Commission. The total sum of observed causal relationships is 
presented in Table 6. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
As predicted by the institutional perspective, the organisational embeddedness of SNEs affect 
their role enactment. The data demonstrates that SNEs evoke departmental and epistemic 
roles more strongly than the supranational role. The intergovernmental role is barely 
emphasised. Behaviour that transcends the imperative logic of intergovernmentalism is also 
seen within the College of Commissioners (Egeberg 2006), among top Commission officials 
(Hooghe 2005) and among the vast majority of national officials who attend Commission and 
Council committees (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2006). Supranational, departmental and 
epistemic roles are also observed within the secretariats of other international organisations – 
such as the WTO and the OECD (Trondal, Marcussen and Veggeland 2005). Table 6 
underscores that departmental and epistemic representation is positively associated with the 
horizontal organisation of the Commission as well as organisational incompatibility across 
levels of government. Epistemic representation is also positively associated with having an 
international educational background. As predicted, departmental and epistemic 
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representation is also negatively related to formal ranks within the Commission. The role as a 
supranational representative is foremost associated by having a top position in the 
Commission, experiencing organisational incompatibility across levels of governance, having 
the Commission as the primary affiliation, as well as interacting intensively within the 
Commission. In sum, representation within the Commission is indeed a balancing act that is 
considerably biased by the formal organisation of the Commission, the multiple 
organisational embeddedness of the officials, their degrees of organisational affiliation 
towards the Commission, their mode of interaction inside the Commission, as well as their 
educational backgrounds.  
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is financed by the research project “DISC: Dynamics of International Executive 
Institutions” (the Norwegian Research Council), and by “CONNEX: Connecting Excellence 
on European Governance” (the EUs 6th. Framework Programme, priority 7: Citizens and 
Governance). Thanks to Lene Jeppesen Ceeberg for research assistance and to Torbjorn 
Larsson for research collaboration.  
2 For example, Art. 6:2 claims that ”[a] SNE shall take part in missions or external meetings 
only if accompanying a Commission official or temporary agent, or acting alone as an 
observer or for information purposes”. 
3 This section is inspired by Trondal and Veggeland 2003. 
4 At least four concepts of representative quality may be identified in the literature. First, 
representation as “acting for” (Pitkin 1972: 112). This notion of representation claims that 
“true representation entails responsiveness to the represented, attention to his wishes or 
needs” (Pitkin 1972: 113). Representation entails acting in accordance with the wishes and 
interests of those they represent. Second, demographic representation “depends on the 
representative’s characteristics, or what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing 
something” (Pitkin 1972: 61 - original emphasis). Third, formalistic representation “defines 
representation in terms of a transaction [i.e. election] that takes place at the outset, before the 
actual representing begins” (Pitkin 1972: 39). Fourth, symbolic representation means 
representation “by what he is or how he is regarded” (Pitkin 1972: 113). The loyalties and 
identities enacted by the representatives determine whom they represent (cf. Birch 1971: 15; 
Olsen 1988: 157-158). 
5 The initial sample resulted from a short-list of SNEs provided by the EFTA Secretariat and 
by CLENAD. 
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6 The DGs covered by the study are: DG Education and Culture, DG Employment and Social 
Affairs, DG Enterprise, DG Environment, DG Energy and Transport, Eurostat, DG Fisheries, 
DG Health and Consumer Affairs, DG Information Society, DG Research, DG Taxation and 
Customs Union, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, DG Trade, DG Competition, and DG 
Development.  
5 EU member-states covered: Sweden (N=37), Denmark (N=3), Ireland (N=2), Germany 
(N=4) and France (N=1). EEA countries covered: Norway (N=20) and Iceland (N=2). Three 
respondents did not report their country of origin.  
6 The regression analyses did not include the independent variables (i) formal specialisation of 
the Commission (by purpose or process), and (ii) the organisational affiliation of SNEs 
(primary vs. secondary). The reason for not including these variables in the regression 
analyses is that they are not available in the SPSS file and thus not readable for the computer 
programme. The causal effect of these two variables are accounted for in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  
7 Diagnosis of collinearity between the independent variables in Table 5 unveils no 
indications of extreme multicollinearity. Thus, the independent variables have independent 
causal impact on the dependent variables. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Correlates of theoretical predictions 
 Intergovernmental 
representation 
Supranational 
representation 
Departmental 
representation 
Epistemic 
representation 
Formal organisation of 
the Commission 
- Specialisation by 
purpose 
- Specialisation by 
process 
- Formal rank 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
-- 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
≠ 
-- 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
+ 
-- 
Multiple organisational 
embeddedness 
- compatible 
- incompatible 
 
 
+ 
-- 
 
 
-- 
+ 
 
 
+ 
-- 
 
 
+ 
-- 
Commission affiliation 
- primary 
- secondary 
 
-- 
+ 
 
+ 
-- 
 
≠ 
≠ 
 
≠ 
≠ 
Actor interaction inside 
the Commission 
- Intensive 
interaction 
- Sustained 
interaction 
 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
Educational background 
- international 
education 
- national 
education 
 
 
-- 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
-- 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
 
 
+ 
 
-- 
Key: 
+ Positive correlation 
-- Negative correlation 
≠ No predicted correlation 
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Table 2: Percent of SNEs emphasising the following four loyalties (absolute numbers in 
parantheses) 
 Fairly much or 
very much 
Both/and Fairly little or 
very little 
Total 
Intergovernmental loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the member-
states as a group 
 
 
47 
 
 
30 
 
 
23 
 
 
100 
(66) 
Supranational loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the 
Commission as a whole 
 
 
65 
 
 
15 
 
 
20 
 
 
100 
(66) 
- Loyalty towards the Director 
General of own DG 
 
66 
 
16 
 
18 
 
100 
(67) 
Departmental loyalty: 
- Loyalty towards the Director 
of own Directorate 
 
 
78 
 
 
12 
 
 
10 
 
 
100 
(68) 
- Neutral enforcement of 
decisions and established 
regulations within the 
Commission 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
100 
(64) 
Epistemic loyalty: 
- Professional neutrality within 
own position 
 
 
88 
 
 
9 
 
 
3 
 
 
100 
(65) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37
                                                                                                                                                        
Table 3: SNEs’ perception of the representational roles evoked by other SNEs (percent – 
absolute numbers in parantheses) 
 Strongly agree Both/and Strongly disagree Total 
A ‘government 
representative’ role 
 
6 
 
33 
 
61 
 
100 (69) 
 A ‘Commission 
representative’ role 
 
39 
 
53 
 
8 
 
100 (64) 
A ‘DG/Unit representative’ 
role 
 
74 
 
22 
 
5 
 
100 (65) 
An ‘independent expert’ 
role 
 
74 
 
20 
 
6 
 
100 (69) 
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Table 4: Percent of SNEs feeling an allegiance (identify or feel responsible to) towards 
the following (absolute numbers in parentheses) 
 Fairly strongly 
or very 
strongly 
Both/and Fairly weakly or 
very weakly 
Total 
Intergovernmental 
allegiance: 
 - The government of own 
country 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
100 
(65) 
Supranational 
allegiance: 
- The EU system as a 
whole 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
100 
(64) 
- The Commission as a 
whole 
 
69 
 
22 
 
9 
 
100 
(67) 
Departmental allegiance: 
- The DG in which SNEs 
work 
 
 
84 
 
 
9 
 
 
7 
 
 
100 
(68) 
- The Unit in which SNEs 
work 
 
84 
 
10 
 
6 
 
100 
(68) 
Epistemic allegiance: 
Own professional 
(educational) background 
and expertise 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
100 
(67) 
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Table 5: Factors that relates to SNEs’ perception of the representational roles evoked by 
other SNEs (Beta)a 
 A ‘government 
representative’ 
role 
A ‘Commission 
representative’ 
role 
A ‘DG/Unit 
representative’ 
role 
A ‘independent 
expert’ role 
Formal organisation 
of the Commission 
- Formal rankb 
 
 
.60** 
 
 
-.16 
 
 
-.30 
 
 
-.42** 
Multiple 
organisational 
embeddedness 
- Incompatible 
portfolios across 
levels of governmentf 
 
 
 
 
 
-.28 
 
 
 
 
 
.29 
 
 
 
 
 
.34 
 
 
 
 
 
.65** 
Actor interaction 
inside the 
Commission 
- Interaction with  
fellow colleagues 
with other national 
origins outside officec 
- Seniority within the 
Commissiond 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.37* 
 
-.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.02 
 
.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
Educational 
background 
- International 
educational 
backgrounde 
 
 
 
 
.18 
 
 
 
 
-.12 
 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
 
 
 
.33* 
*) p ≤ 0.05 ,**) p ≤ 0.01         R2 = .41                        R2 = .14                     R2 =  .19                       R2 = .51 
Key: 
a) The dependent variables have the following values: Value 1 (strongly agree)), value 2 (do not know)), 
value 3 (strongly disagree).  
b) This variable has the following values: Value 1 (A4 to A5), value 2 (A6 to A7), value 3 (A8), value 4 
(scientific officer). 
c) This variable has the following values: Value 1 (very often ), value 2 (fairly often), value 3 (both/and), 
value 4 (fairly seldom), value 5 (very seldom). 
d) This variable is continuous ranging from 1 year to 11 years. (Secondment contracts have a maximum 
length of four years. However, some SNEs may renew their contracts beyond four years).   
e) This variable is dichotomous by default: Value 1 (international university education), value 2 (national 
university education) 
f) This variable has the following values: Value 1 (incompatible portfolio = previous professional 
occupation within domestic ministry or agency that do not correspond to current Commission 
portfolio), value 2 (compatible portfolio = previous professional occupation within domestic ministry or 
agency that correspond to current Commission portfolio). 
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Table 6: Summary of observed causal relationships 
 Intergovernmental 
representation 
Supranational 
representation 
Departmental 
representation 
Epistemic 
representation 
Formal organisation of 
the Commission 
- Specialisation by 
purpose 
- Specialisation by 
process 
- Formal rank 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
(+) 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
≠ 
-- 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
+ 
--** 
Multiple organisational 
embeddedness 
- compatible 
- incompatible 
 
 
+ 
-- 
 
 
-- 
+ 
 
 
(--) 
(+) 
 
 
(--) 
(+**) 
Commission affiliation 
- primary 
- secondary 
 
-- 
+ 
 
+ 
-- 
 
≠ 
≠ 
 
≠ 
≠ 
Actor interaction inside 
the Commission 
- Intensive 
interaction 
- Sustained 
interaction 
 
 
 
--* 
 
(≠) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
(≠) 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
Educational background 
- international 
education 
- national 
education 
 
 
(≠) 
 
(≠) 
 
 
(≠) 
 
(≠) 
 
 
≠ 
 
≠ 
 
 
+* 
 
-- 
Key: 
+ Positive correlation 
-- Negative correlation 
≠ No correlation 
()  Non-predicted correlation 
*  p ≤ 0.05 
* p ≤ 0.01 
 
